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AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellant, for the purpose of this Reply Brief, adopts the 
Statement of Facts set forth in her original Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT, BONNIE BIRCH, HAS MARSHALED THE 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND BY DOING SO HAS SHOWN 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE ISSUE OF INCOMPETENCY, 
AND THE CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THE COURT ARE NOT 
2 
SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
AND THE COURT HAS FAILED TO APPLY THE 
APPROPRIATE RULE OF LAW TO THE FACTS. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT UNDER THE FACTS 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES ELICITED IN THE TRIAL OF THE 
CASE IN RULING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A FINDING OF UNDUE 
INFLUENCE REQUIRED CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
RELATIVE TO THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH 
ULTIMATELY PERTAIN TO THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF 
INCOMPETENCY OF DECEDENT, AS FOUND AND 
DECREED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The Respondent, in his Reply Brief, has alleged that the 
Appellant has failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support 
of her position on appeal. Findings of Fact numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
and 10, as challenged by the Appellant, present a challenge in 
marshalling the evidence with delicate and precise delineation due 
to the fact that many aspects of the same testimony and evidence 
could arguably support or refute the findings of fact under attack. 
It is because of this realization the Appellant canvassed the 
entire record, and has described for this Court the evidence and 
testimony which we consider to be of significant, credible and 
probative value, and respectfully submit that there is contained 
within the Appellant's Brief, a complete and detailed documentation 
of the record as we view the same to have application to those 
findings challenged by Appellant. 
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It would be presumptuous for the Appellant to contend that 
there is but one single version of the facts, evidence and 
testimony applicable to a particular finding of the Trial Court, as 
the total evidence and testimony is so intermingled that the same 
is susceptible of various interpretations. It is for this reason 
we believe that this Court should consider the totality of the 
evidence and testimony cited and then lend its direction and 
guidance in rejecting or confirming the validity of same as applied 
to the issues raised. The evidence and testimony cited in the 
"Statement of Facts" and "Argument" of Appellant's Brief, have been 
marshaled to focus upon that which is believed to be of 
significant, credible and probative value. Counsel for Respondent 
may have followed a different format; however, we believe the 
responsibility of bringing before this Court the evidence and 
testimony which have a bearing on the critical issues has been 
complied with. 
Findings of Fact numbers 3 and 4 present difficulty in showing 
that they are without adeguate support, without considering almost 
each and every aspect of the record. To say that the trial judge 
could not reasonably believe or disbelieve a particular witness or 
reconcile the testimonies of the different witnesses is of such a 
nebulous nature that arguably the entire record would be at issue 
on these findings. Throughout the Appellant's Brief we have 
attempted to cite the evidence and testimony which would bear upon 
these two findings of fact, and concede that it presents a close 
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call to challenge the same. 
The challenge to Finding of Fact number 10 is primarily 
directed to that portion which finds the Will of February 1, 1977 
to be "the last Will and Testament" of the Decedent, which is more 
in the nature of a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact and is 
challenged on that basis only. 
Findings of Fact numbers 5, 6 and 7 are of such gravity that 
the primary focus has been on these three issues in Appellant's 
Brief. 
To conclude that there has been no marshaling of the evidence 
on Finding of Fact number 5 presupposes that credible evidence in 
support of such fact exists. We have cited throughout Appellant's 
Brief the credible evidence and testimony relating to this finding, 
and respectfully submit that without engaging in speculation and 
conjecture no credible evidence can be cited in support of such a 
finding. Notwithstanding, we have invited the Court's attention to 
the various testimonies and evidence elicited on the issue and 
whether or not those portions marshaled and cited support or 
disavow such a finding is the ultimate guestion before this Court. 
The testimonies and evidence pertaining to Finding of Fact 
number 6 have been marshaled and cited throughout the Appellant's 
Brief in both the facts and the argument. As with Finding of Fact 
number 5, much of the same testimony and evidence cited is 
susceptible of different interpretations, and for that reason 
cannot be categorized as standing for a specific side of the issue. 
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The totality of the evidence and testimony, however, we respectably 
submit dictates that the trial court erred and that the marshaling 
of the evidence requirement has been complied with. 
As noted in Appellant's original brief Id at 28, Finding of 
Fact number 7 appears to be more in the nature of a Conclusion of 
Law than a Finding of Fact, or a mixed Finding of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law, and the genesis of such finding finds its roots 
in the same testimony and evidence involved in Findings of Fact 
numbers 5 and 6. 
Should this Court conclude that the findings of the trial 
court on the issue of incompetency, as primarily reflected by 
Findings of Fact numbers 5, 6 and 7, are incorrect or that the 
Trial Court misapplied the law to the facts, the significance of 
Findings of Fact number 3 and 4 are relegated to relative 
insignificance. 
POINT II 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO SHOW UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE INSTANT 
CASE REQUIRED CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, 
WAS CORRECT 
Conclusion of Law number 7 (R 339) states: 
"The burden of proof to establish that a Will 
is void for undue influence is clear and 
convincing evidence." 
Respondent attempted to show that the wills of November 10, 
1988 and/or November 15, 1988 were procured by undue influence on 
the part of the Appellant. In addressing and rejecting this 
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contention the Court observed in its ruling from the bench as 
follows: 
"Undue influence, I think, is a little harder 
matter. Because of my view that the standard 
of proof is clear and convincing evidence and 
I think this is a very difficult case because 
of the testimony on both sides and I don't 
think I can find by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was under the influence of 
undue influence, although probably if the 
standard of proof were different, I'd come to 
a different conclusion, but based upon the 
fact that I find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was not competent, either on 
November 11th or November 15th, I find that 
both of these wills are not valid, will not be 
admitted to probate and consequently, the 
earlier will of — whenever it was— * * * 
February 1, 1977, will be admitted to probate" 
(R 957, 958). 
Counsel for respondent then queried the Court as follows: 
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your Honor. Do you also want me to 
include a ruling on the confidential relationship issue? 
THE COURT: I think not. I don't think it needs to be ruled 
on, really. This case is disposed of on competency grounds, and I 
think I decline to rule on the confidential relationship issue. 
(Emphasis added) (R 958) 
Although the Court signed and adopted the findings of fact 
prepared by counsel for respondent, it is difficult to reconcile 
finding of fact number 8 (R 338) with the ruling made from the 
bench which made no mention of "preponderance of evidence" as it 
pertains to undue influence (R 957, 958). Nevertheless, turning to 
the direct issue raised in the cross-appeal, it is necessary to 
review the status of the law on this issue as presently structured. 
The law is unsettled with respect to the burden of proof 
required in a will contest on the issue of undue influence. 
On July 1, 1977, Utah adopted the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-8-101(1) 1978. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-407, 1953 as amended provides in 
part: 
»* * * contestants of a Will have the burden 
of establishing lack of testamentary intent or 
capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, 
mistake, or revocation. * * *" 
The case of Anderson v. Anderson, 43 U.26, 134 P. 553 is cited 
in the annotations for authority on the issue of quantum of proof 
in undue influence cases. A reading of the Anderson case does not 
reveal a definitive answer except to note that the Utah Court 
stated: 
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 * * * no hard and fast rule can be laid down 
which shall control in every case. Each case 
must, to a very large extent, be determined 
upon its own facts and circumstances, and in 
arriving at a conclusion the foregoing general 
rule should always be kept in mind." 
The Court further noted that under the evidence in Anderson, 
"It is the duty of the Courts to uphold the 
Will." 
The Utah Supreme Court, In Anderson, adopted the rule and 
doctrine laid down in the case of In Re Higgins1 Estate, 156 Cal. 
257, 104 P. 6 as follows: 
"Undue Influence, however used, must, in order 
to avoid a Will, destroy the free agency of 
the testator at the time, and in the very act 
of the making of the testament. It must bear 
directly upon the testamentary act" Id 557 
As noted in Koeslina v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah, 1975), 
the burden of proof may shift during the trial, but the burden of 
persuasion does not, and it is this burden which the contestant 
(respondent) was required to meet in asserting undue influence. 
In the case of In Re Bryan's Estate, 25 P. 2d 602 (Utah, 1933), 
the Supreme Court of this state noted that: 
"Undue Influence must be proved, it will not 
be presumed from mere interest or 
opportunity." Id 610 
The Court further cited with approval, the rule as stated in 
40 Cyc. 1144 which in part holds: 
ii* * *
 n o precise quantity of influence can be 
said to be necessary and sufficient in all 
cases, as the amount necessarily varies with 
the circumstances of each case, and especially 
does it vary accordingly as the strength or 
weakness of mind of each testator varies, the 
amount of influence necessary to dominate a 
mind impaired by age, disease, or dissipation 
being obviously less than that required to 
control a strong mind." Id 610 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of In Re Goldsberry's 
Estate, 81 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1938) discussed the issue of undue 
influence, and although not specifically delineating or addressing 
the issue of quantum of proof, cited with approval the rule of law 
in the case of In Re Sproston's Estate, Cal. App., 39 P. 2d 266, 
affirmed 52 P.2d 924, as follows: 
n* * * in order to set aside a Will for undue 
influence, there must be substantial proof of 
pressure which overpowered the volition of the 
testator at the time the Will was made." Id 
1113 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Goldsberrvf s Estate
 f supra, 
referred to In Re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256 and noted 
that "the evidence was directed almost entirely to the testators 
sanity. There was no evidence of undue influence." Id 1113 
The critical issue raised here was not specifically addressed 
in Hanson and lends little help in clarifying the issue. 
The case of In Re George's Estate 112 P.2d 498, (Utah 1941) 
once again adopts the language of Goldsberry and uses the language 
that "substantial proof of a pressure which overpowered the 
volition of the testator at the time the Will was made" as the 
reguisite proof. 
Again in the case of In Re LaVelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372 
(Utah 1952) the Supreme Court held: 
"To declare a Will invalid because of undue 
influence, there must be an exhibition of more 
than influence or suggestion, there must be 
substantial proof of an overpowering of the 
testator's volition at the time the will was 
made, to the extent he is impelled to do that 
which he would not have done had he been free 
from such controlling influence, so that the 
will represents the desire of the person 
exercising the influence rather than that of 
the testator. This showing need not be based 
on proof of physical coercion or constraint." 
Counsel for Respondent cites In Re Buttars' Estate, 261 P.2d 
171 (Utah 1953) to support his claim that a "preponderance" of the 
evidence is the guantum of proof reguired to prevail on the issue 
of undue influence. We submit that a careful reading of this case 
discloses that the Court is there talking about the burden of going 
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forward and is not addressing the ultimate issue of "Burden of 
persuasion". See Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975) 
Supra. See also In Re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1952) Id 
In order to avoid confusion and 
misunderstanding of the nature and effect of 
presumptions, the distinctions between the 
various expressions used in connection 
therewith must be kept clearly in mind. For 
instance the expressions "burden of 
persuasion" and "burden of producing or going 
forward with the evidence" differ in that the 
former requires that the fact finder must be 
convinced by the evidence that the existing 
facts are in favor of the party who has such 
burden in order to find the issue of facts on 
that question in his favor, but the burden 
described in the latter expression is of 
temporary nature and is eliminated from the 
case by a prima facie showing of facts on such 
issue in favor of the party having such 
burden. Only a presumption which merely 
shifts the burden of producing evidence is 
eliminated or vanishes from the case upon a 
prima facie showing to the contrary. * * *" Id 
689 
See also 57 Am.Jur., Wills, §386, Id 278. 
The language in some of the cases cited above refer to the 
quantum of proof required to show undue influence as being 
"substantial". The Utah Supreme Court in Greener v. Greener, 212 
P.2d 194, (Utah 1949), Justice Wolfe, writing for the Court, 
stated: 
"But for a matter to be clear and convincing 
to a particular mind it must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no 
serious or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion. A mind which 
was of the opinion that it was convinced and 
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yet which entertained, not a slight, but a 
reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its 
conclusion, would seem to be in a state of 
confusion." (Emphasis added) 
The meaning of the term "substantial" has been addressed by 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Lumpkins v. McPhee, 
286 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1955). On the issue of fraud, it held: 
"The evidence in support of a finding of fraud 
is not deemed substantial, if it is not clear, 
strong and convincing. First National Bank v. 
Lesser, supra; Shaw v. Board of Education, 
supra; Frear v. Roberts, 51 N.M. 137, 179 P.2d 
998; and where it is evenly balanced or barely 
tips the scales in a party's favor, that is, 
barely preponderates, it is not so supported. 
When all the evidence is in, fraud being the 
issue, or fraudulent intent to bring it down 
to the present case, if the greatest effect it 
has on the mind of the fact finder is to leave 
it confronted by a question mark on the vital 
issue, was there fraud?-then there is not that 
type of evidence which alone is to be deemed 
substantial and a finding of fraud cannot be 
supported. 
Undue influence has been characterized as a species of fraud. 
Page on Wills §122; In Re Ricks1 Estate, 117 P. 539, (Cal. 1911) Id 
545; In Re Newhall's Estate 214 P. 231 (Cal. 1923); 
Utah has long recognized that the burden of proof (burden of 
persuasion) in fraud cases requires clear and convincing evidence 
to sustain such a charge. Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273, (Utah 
1952); Shaw v. Abraham, 364 P.2d 7 (Utah 1961); 
Although not Will contest cases, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that written contracts should be regarded with some degree of 
sanctity and can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 
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See Otteson v. Malone, 584 P.2d 878 (Utah, 1978). Resource 
Management Company v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 286 P.2d 1065. 
Utah cases have recognized that clear and convincing evidence 
is the quantum of proof required to successfully attack a deed upon 
the grounds of undue influence. Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 
(Utah 1978); Richmond v. Ballard, 325 P.2d 839 (Utah 1958); 
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945); O'Reilly v. 
McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770 (1934). 
In the Peterson case Supra, it was noted: 
* * *the burden of showing undue influence in 
the execution of the deed is even greater than 
that of showing incompetence. It must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the grantee exercised a dominating 
influence over the grantor. 
Undue influence reduced to its simplest terms is a 
substitution of the Will of the grantee-devisee for that of the 
grantor-testator. The logic and reasoning dictates that clear and 
convincing evidence should be the standard of proof in an undue 
influence case. 
In the presentation of the present case, Judge Daniels, 
viewing the evidence and testimony adduced in the trial, may well 
have perceived that the matters urged by respondent as constituting 
"undue influence" fell within the ambit of fraudulent or deceptive 
conduct and in ruling as he did as to the quantum of proof required 
on this issue, the appropriate rule of law was applied in requiring 
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that the proof of persuasion be that of clear and convincing 
evidence, taking into account the "facts and circumstances" of the 
case at hand. 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
In analyzing the issue of undue influence and the quantum of 
proof necessary to sustain such a charge, the rulings and holdings 
in other jurisdictions are, in our opinion, of significance. It 
has been noted in the case of In Re Draper's Estate, 374 P.2d 425 
(Wyo. 1962) as follows: 
"Clear proof of such influence is required in 
order that a solemnly executed testament may 
be set aside for undue influence.* * *" In Re 
Andersons fs Estate, 71 Wyo. 238, 255 P. 2d 983, 
986. 
»* * *wills deliberately made by persons of 
sound mind are not to be lightly set aside, 
and the undue influence which will warrant 
doing so must be proven to be such as destroys 
the free agency nd thereby substitutes the 
will of another for that of the testator. * * 
*" Cook v. Boldue, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580, 
581, 582, 158 P. 266" 
See also Frear v. Roberts, 179 P.2d 998 (N.M. 1947): 
"Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved 
by clear and satisfactory evidence;" 
First National Bank of Albuquerque v. Abraham, 639 P.2d 575 (N.M. 
1982); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 286 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1955): 
"Evidence in support of finding of fraud is 
not deemed substantial if it is not clear, 
strong and convincing, and where it is evenly 
balanced or barely tips the scales in a 
parties1 favor it is not so supported." 
Substantial evidence: Ankeny v. Grunstead, 551 P.2d 1027 
14 
(Mont. 1976) 
"Substantial evidence has been defined as such 
evidence as will convince reasonable men and 
on which such men may not reasonably differ as 
to whether it establishes the Plaintiff's 
case, and, if all reasonable men must conclude 
that the evidence does not establish such 
case, then it is not substantial evidence." 
See also Sands v. Superior Buildings Co.. 349 P.2d 314 
(Montana 1960), 
"Substantial evidence" is a term that cannot 
be defined definitely, and whether evidence in 
a particular case amounts to substantiality is 
a question of law on appeal which must be 
determined from facts of each case as it 
arises". Mississippi Public Service v. U.S. 
D.C. Miss, 124 F. Supp. 809, 814 
It is stated in 95 C.J.S. Wills §251 P. 1122 as follows: 
According to some authorities, a preponderance 
of the evidence is necessary and sufficient to 
establish undue influence in the execution of 
a will. However, in numerous cases, it has 
been said that undue influence, invalidating a 
will, must be established by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence by 
compelling evidence, or by the manifest weight 
of the evidence. In any event undue influence 
in the execution of a will must be shown by 
substantial evidence and evidence which merely 
raises a suspicion or conjecture that the will 
was the product of undue influence is 
insufficient. . .(emphasis added) 
In the case of Withers v. Withers, 363 Pa 431, 70 A. 2d 331 
(1950) it was stated: 
the quality and sufficiency of testimony 
necessary to establish proof of undue 
influence is the same whether relating to 
wills or inter vivos documents. 
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CONCLUSION 
The prevailing rule indicates that each case involving the 
issue of undue influence must be determined upon its own facts and 
circumstances. The evidence and testimony required to establish 
undue influence may vary with the circumstances of each case, 
considering all factors necessary to dominate the mind of the 
testator at the time the Will was made. 
In the instant case, the trial judge had before him the 
testimony and evidence detailing the physical condition of the 
testator and was obliged, under the prevailing law, to take into 
account and consider all facts and circumstances necessary to carry 
the burden of persuasion (burden of proof) on the critical issue. 
Based upon the authorities cited above, we respectfully submit 
that the trial judge made a correct pronouncement of the law under 
the facts and circumstances involved. 
Based upon the foregoing and the matters set forth and 
contained in Appellant's prior brief, we respectfully submit that 
the Trial Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment denying the 
admission to probate of the Decedent's Will of November 10, 1988 or 
November 15, 1988 are erroneous and contrary to law and/or the 
Court has failed to apply the law to the facts, and the Judgment of 
the Trial Court should be reversed by this Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
r/0 
this day of August, 1992. 
y^> 
ERRANT H. WALL 
attorney for Appellant 
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